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1. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1 has as its underlying ideal the concept of
equality for all South Africans. Given this country's previous political and legal system of
apartheid which was premis~d on the unequal distibution of resources, favouring the minority
White population, it is easy to understand why equality is regarded as the cornerstone of this
democracy.
However, in South Africa, the process of equality, especially for Black women is not simple.
Because of our country's political history, many Black people want to defend their traditional
values against Western influence. Hence, Black women are caught in the middle of a struggle
between the feminist ideal of gender equality for all women and the strong pull toward a tradition
which is inherently sexist.
Any proposal for reform has to be sympathetic to this fact and must work within this framework
in order to meet the approval of the women to whom it applies. This article focuses on how this
struggle may be overcome without the complete destruction of either ideal.
The first step to dealing with an analysis of gender equality and customary law is to recognise
that the Constitution itself is manifestly contradictory. On the one hand, we have the right to
equality being at the very heart of the constitutional order while on the other, there is a
recognition of customary law which is inherently 'systematically discriminatory'2. The problem
that we are confronted with is that our country is an African country and it would be unjust and
indeed impossible not to recognise these foundations. Thus while the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land3 and all laws inconsistent with it are invalid, such an assertion may not be easily
tenable when faced with customary law. Kerr points out that if customary law were to be changed
to comply with the Constitution, then 85% of customary law would not survive.4 Hence, this
paper proposes a working model of how to create harmony between the two ideals.
2. CONCEPTIJALISING CUSTOMARY LAW
Customary la~ is defined as 'the customs and usages traditionally observed among the
1 Act 108 of 1996
2 V. Bronstein 'Reconceptualising the Customary Law Debate in South Africa' (1998) 14
SAJHR 388-410 at 392
3 See section 2 of Act 108 of 1996
4 AJ Kerr 1nheritance in Customary Law under the Interim Constitution and under the
Present Constitution' (1998) 115 SALJ262-270 at 266
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indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which fonn part of the culture of those peoples. '
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Kim Robinson6 has argued that customary law is a corruption of indigenous law,made up of a
compromise between Black power brokers and the dominant White .power ~t~cture. ~he le~ed
author is of the view that the incorporation of the indigenous law Into a ngId and alIen wrItten
regime of customary law distorted the concept of indigenous law and resulted in the following:
i. The ultimate interpretation of these laws was shifted from the communities concerned to
colonial and apartheid administrations; and
ii. The oral, fluid and dynamic nature of indigenous law was destroyed.
She said,
"Ifthe purpose ofIndigenous law is to reflect a living culture ofAfrican people, codified
customary law cannot fulfil this objective because it freezes African life. Tradition is
neither a stagnant concept nor are they maintained simply for the sake of traditions.
Tradition has meaning and is retained because it provides continuity, is purposeful and
represents the values ofa people. As a result certain traditions are kept, others are cast
off, others are altered as circumstances andperspectives change - all with the objective
ofserving the needs ofthe community. When laws that allegedly reflect tradition cease
to be appropriate to peoples' lives, they are obsolete and should be rejected. "7
While this may be a legitimate argument, it does not address the fact that the majority of citizens
in this country practice customary law in their daily lives. Hence, this assertion is unhelpful.
Under customary law, women are subjected to the authority of a patriarch, moving from the
control of their guardians to that of their husbands. The male head of the household represents
the family and a woman cannot generally contract or litigate without assistance. Husbands'
control virtually all the family's property while wives' rights are confined to things such as items
of a personal nature. Women cannot initiate a divorce process but must enlist the help of the
bridewealth holder. Husbands' on the other hand, may simply unilaterally repudiate ;heir wives
or if they wish to retain their bridewealth, can rely on specified grounds. Finally on divorce, the
children "belong" to the husbands family.8
5 As defined in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998
6 K. Robinson 'The Minority and Subordinate Status of African Women Under
Customary Law' (1995)11 SAJHR 3 p457-476 at 460
7 Gp cit, n6 at 460
8 F. Kaganas & C. Murray 'Law and Women's Rights in South Africa: An Overview' in Women
and the Law S. Jagwanth, PJ Schwikkard, &" B Grant (eds) (1994) Human Sciences Research
Council, Pretoria p1-38 at 17
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Hence it is evident that customary law practices do by their very nature lead to severe inequalities
between the sexes.
3. THE RIGHT TO EQIJALITY
It can hardly be understated that due to South Africa's apartheid dispensation, equality is the
cornerstone ofthis democracy. Reference is made throughout the Constitution ofthis basic right.
9
Section 9 sets out the right to equality as follows:
1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection ofthe law and
benefit ofthe law.
(2) Equality includes the right to full and equal enjoyment ofall rights andjreedoms. To
promote the achievement ofequality, legislative and other measures designed to protect
or advance persons, or categories ofpersons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one
or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate on any ofthe grounds listed in subsection 9(3).
National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more ofthe grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless
it is established that the discrimination is fair.
Albertyn and Kentridge lO argue that when interpreting the equality clause, it is essential to read
it as setting out a substantive concept of equality. They argue this based on the fact that:
(c •••formal equality presupposes that all persons are equal bearers ofrights. It
ignores actual social and economic disparities between groups and individuals
and constructs standards which appear to be neutral, but which in truth embodies
a set ofparticular needs and experiences which derive from socially privileged
groups. So a reliance on a formal notion ofequality may actually exacerbate
inequality. Substantive equality on the other hand, requires an examination ofthe
actual social and economic conditions ofgroups and individuals in order to
9 See for example the Preamble and sections 1, 36 and 39.
10 Cited in S. Ngaba 'CEDAW: Eliminating Discrimination Against Women' (1995) 27 Agenda
at 87
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determine whether the Constitution's commitment to equality is being upheld.
Such an enquiry reveals a world of systematic and pervasive group-based
inequalities, which need io be taken into account in the formulation of legal
approaches to equality rights. "
3.1 THE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO EQIJALITY
The three leading cases on the interpretation of the equality provision are Hugo ll , Prinsloo l2 and
Harksen 13 •
Govenderl4 has extrapolated the relevant principles that derived from these judgements. An
applicant who is relying on a violation of the equality clause must show three things:
i. That the provision under attack differentiates between people, or categories of people,
and that this differentiation is not rationally connected to a legitimate governmental
purpose (this is a section 9(1) inquiry), or,
ii. That he or she has been unfairly discriminated against. If the differentiation is on one
of the grounds specified in section 9(3), then discrimination is deemed to be established.
If the differentiation is not on one of the specified grounds, then discrimination is only
deemed to have taken place if, objectively speaking, the ground is based on attributes or
characteristics which have the potential to impair fundamental dignity. If the
discrimination is not on one of the specified grounds then the applicant will have to
demonstrate unfairness by showing that the impact of the discrimination on him or her
is unfair.
iii. Even if the discrimination is found to be unfair, the measure may still be saved if it
satisfies the requirements of the limitations clause, that is, if it is a law of general
application and is reasonable and justifiable l5 •
11 President ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa v Hugo 1997(6) BCLR 708 (CC)
12 Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and Another 1997(6) BCLR 759 (CC)
13 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1997(11) BCLR 1489 (CC)
14 K. Govender 'The Equality Provision, Unfair Discrimination, and Affirmative Action'
(1998) 15(1) Indicator South Africa p79 - 84 at 79
15 Gp cit, n 13.
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In both Prinsloo/6 and Harksen 17 the court defined discrimination as "treating people differently
in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings." However, in order to
successfully plead a violation of the equality clause, one has to establish that the discrimination
is unfair.
This issue arose in Hugo l8 • The court had regard to the following factors:
1. The fact that the individuals discriminated against do not belong to a class which had
historically been disadvantaged does not necessarily make the discrimination fair;
2. At the heart of the prohibition against unfair discrimination lies the imperative to
establish a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect
regardless of their membership to particular groups. The goal cannot be achieved by
insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances. The question is whether the
overall impact of the measure furthers the constitutional goal of equality; and
3. In order to determine whether the impact is unfair, it is necessary to consider the
following:
*the group who has been disadvantaged;
*the nature of the power in terms of which the discrimination is effected;
*the nature of the interests which have been affected by the discrimination.
Harksen 19 provided further guidelines on what constitutes unfair discrimination:
i. The position of the complainant in society and whether the complainant suffered from
past patterns of discrimination;
ii. The nature of the provision or the power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it.
What must be considered is whether the primary purpose is to achieve a worthy and
important societal goal which inevitably gave rise to the infringement;
iii. The extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and whether
there has been an impairment of his or her fundamental dignity.
Taking the guidelines of these cases into consideration, the present stance of customary law will
be assessed with reference to the customary law of succession favouring male primogeniture and
polygyny.
16 Gp cit, n 12
17 Gp cit, n 13
18 Gp cit, n 11
19 Gp cif, n 13
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4. THE CIJSTOMARY LAW OF SIICCESSION
Section 23 of the Black Administrations Act20 generally excludes Black women from intestate
succession. Customary law applies the system of male primogeniture, that is, the estate seeks a
male heir, whether a descendent or parent or a grandparent. This section is problematic because
it deprives female children and wives from inheriting where the deceased did not have a valid
will.
The issue was brought to the fore in Mthembu v Letsela and Another 1997(2)SA 936(T)
where the question that faced the court was whether this rule of succession unfairly discriminated
between persons on the grounds of sex or gender and was thus in conflict with the equality
clause.
The applicant was an adult Zulu woman who had entered into a customary marriage with the
deceased. Her husband was killed, dying intestate. The applicant and their daughter lived in a
house of which the deceased was the holder of a leasehold title. His father, the first respondent,
then claimed that the house had devolved on him by virtue of section 23. Judge Le ROUX21 held
((the devolution ofthe deceased's property to the male heir involves a concomitant duty
ofsupport andprotection ofthe woman ... to whom he was married by customary law and
ofthe children procreated under that system and belonging to a particular house. JJ
It was further said that a widow may not be ejected from the deceased's homestead.
The judge then gave his reasons for the decision as follows:
(( Ifone accepts the duty to provide sustenance, maintenance and shelter as a necessary
corollary of the system of primogeniture ...1 find it difficult to equate this form of
differentiation between men and women with the concept ofunfair discrimination as used
in s8 of the [interim] Constitution. ..1n view of the manifest acknowledgement of
customary law as a system existingparallel to the common law by the Constitution ... and
the freedom granted to persons to choose this system as governing their relationships (as
implied by section 31) 1 cannot accept the submission that the succession rule is
necessarily in conflict with section 8. Neither is it contrary to public policy or natural
justice... JJ .
It is submitted that a dual system of law (as recognised by Le Roux J ) cannot work, for it creates
among its citizens an imbalance of rights. What applies to one group does not apply to another.
In this case, it differentiates between Black women and other women- creating more rights for
the latter group and thus completely defeating the purpose of the right to equality.
20 Act 38 of 1927
21 At 945
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Teson makes an apt observation by saying:
" There is nothing ,for example, in the nature ofa third world woman that makes her less
h . TU d "22eligible for the enjoyment ofhuman rights .... t an a woman zn a rr estern emocracy.
Justice Le Roux then went' further and differentiated between Black people living in rural areas
and those living in urban areas. He said,
. "In rural areas [my emphasis] where this rule most frequently finds its application, the
devolution ofthe deceased's property onto the male heir involves a concomitant duty of
support andprotection ofthe woman or women to whom he was married by customary
law... "23
It is submitted that such a differentiation would not pass constitutional scrutiny as it would then
not be a law of general application. In this vein, Kerr pointed out that the rule will be the same
in rural and urban areas "wherever those within its compass may live".24
The case went on appeal in Mthembu v Letsela andAnother 1998(2) SA 675 TPD. Unfortunately,
Mynhardt J did not offer a significantly different judgement. In reaching his decision, the judge
based his argument completely on the rules of customary law. Mynhardt J dodged the proverbial
"flying bullet" by holding that the development of the customary law rules of succession is a
matter best left to Parliament.25This outlook is problematic. The courts are meant to be the
watchdogs of our justice system and if they ignore this duty then the democracy that the
constitution seeks to uphold will fall. If laws are unfair, they must be rejected by the courts.
Despite the holdings of these courts, it is submitted that when pitched against the test of equality,
section 23 will not pass constitutional scrutiny.
4.1 APPLICATION OF THE TEST OF EQUALITY
The three issues are:
4.1.1 Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If there is a
22 Cited in T.R Nhlapo 'The African Family and Women's Rights: Friends or Foes' (1991) Acta
Juridica p135-146 at 141
23 At 945 E-G
24 Gp cit, n 4 at 264
25 This view is supported by Maithufi who said that while the decision was to be welcomed
"it reads like a riddle" and the court seemed hesitant to reach a decision. See LP Maithufi
'The Constitutionality of the Rule of Primogeniture in Customary Law of Intestate
Succession' (1998) 61 THRHR 142-147 at 146-147
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differentiation, is it rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose?
4.1.2 Is the discrimination unfair?
4.1.3 Application of the limitation clause.
4.1.1 Section 23 states that Black women are excluded from intestate succession. Primafacie,
there is a differentiation based on gender as Black men are entitled to inherit by intestate
succession. It is submitted that this differentiation has no legitimate purpose as it is based on
the customary system of male primogeniture in terms of which the estate seeks a male heir.
Such a system reflects the patriarchal need to keep women subordinate to men. It serves no
purpose in law as there is nothing inherent in the character of a Black male that makes him
a better party to own property over a Black woman.
4.1.2 The discrimination between men and women is automatically unfair as it is on a
specified ground in terms of section 9(3) of the final Constitution,that is, gender.
4.1.3 In assessing reasonableness and justifiability, one must judge the provision in the
context of customary law. The practice itself seeks to elevate the status of the male in the
family while keeping the female status to that of a minor26 • The aim of section 23 seems to
be to increase the wealth and status of the male heir and to keep the females in the family
dependent and subservient. In this light, there is no reasonable justification for the provision
and may not be saved by the limitation clause.
The essence of the right to equality as stated in the trilogy of leading cases is that of human
dignity. There is no doubt that in Mthembu 's case, the applicant's dignity was being infringed
when the court forced her to live with and be under the care of people who did not want to
support her or her daughter. Black women have historically been discriminated against and this
should not be allowed to be perpetuated in the constitutional era. To allow such would be to
undermine the integrity of our Constitution.
Thus, it has been established that the customary law of succession discriminates unfairly against
Black women. So what next? Does the court then declare the practice invalid and leave it to the
traditional leaders and those practising the custom to deal with or is there an alternative?
It is submitted that if the provision were declared invalid in the face of resistance from Black
women who still want to practice customary law, then this too would deprive them of their right
to equality as we would then be imposing our choices on them. To overcome this consideration,
it is submitted that every custom that affects the life of a Black women should only be enacted
if her consent is attained.
If we were to apply this model to the facts ofMthembu then, on the death of her spouse, the wife
would have two choices: Either she could choose to inherit the estate or, she could agree to the
26 See sll(3)(b) of the Black Administrations Act, op cif, n 20
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system of male primogeniture and live with and be supported by her husband's family. If this
proposal is used then Black women will not always be denied the right to own or inherit property.
The same principles would apply to the daughters who stand to inherit from their parents.
Some may argue that such a choice is superfluous as who would choose not to own property if
the choice arose? It is submitted that if the conditions were such that the wife had a good
relationship with her in-laws and they could continue to live together in harmony, then the wife
may agree to follow the custom. In fact, if she does not work and needs to be supported
financially by her in-laws, there is a greater chance that she will agree to the custom. If on the
other hand, the husband wants his property to devolve according to customary law, then such an
agreement should be made at the wedding ceremony of the couple.
It is submitted that such a model can work in all areas of customary law. To illustrate, a quick
example in the contentious area of polygyny will suffice.
5. POLYGYNY27
Polygyny has never been recognised in the South African legal system despite the fact that it is
a practice of the majority of its citizens. In Ismail v Ismaip8 the Appellate Division held that
Islamic marriages, being potentially polygynous, were contrary to public policy and therefore
invalid. More recently, in Kalla v The Master 29 the court observed, in passing, that polygynous
or potentially polygynous marriages may contravene the gender equality principle embodied in
the Constitution and was therefore "as unacceptable to the mores of the new South Africa as they
were to the 0Id."30
With the recognition of the importance of African values and a tolerance thereof by the
government, in Ryland v Edros31 .the court said that the views of only a particular sect of the
community could not make a practice offensive to public policy. The court held that in order for
a contract to be viewed in such a light, this value must be shared by the community at large. 32
Hence the court held that the consequences flowing from a customary marriage, including the
position on divorce, could still be enforced.
27 Since the writing of this article, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998
has come into operation. This Act has accorded recognition to polygynous marriages in
terms of South African law.
281983(l)SA1006(A)
29 1994 (4) BCLR 79(T)
30 At 270G
31 1997(2)SA 690(C)
32 At 707 G-H
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However, the triumph was short-lived as can be seen in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle
Accident Fund33 where Meskin J held that the court does not have a general power to develop the
common law in terms of section 39(2). Rather, it can only develop the common law to promote
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights on those occasions when the legislature does
not give effect to the right in question. The Judge held that while there was a duty of support that
arose from Islamic marriages, it was not within the court's power to alter the existing common
law by eliminating from it an already existing law. This was the duty of the legislature.
Therefore, a widow's legal duty of support arose only out of a lawful marriage. He could not alter
the status quo by finding that such a duty arose out ofan unlawful marriage. Therefore, the MMV
was not legally liable to compensate the widow for loss of support.
Clearly we see that the courts have had a lot of trouble dealing with polygyny and its
consequences. This difficulty has led to many injustices where women who were married by
customary tradition and thereafter, fulfilled the role of wife as in all civil marriages were
deprived of the recognition of this. Such non-recognition had a variety of disadvantages to the
members of such a family, for example, because they were largely unprotected by the law, they
were accorded with very few rights. Thus:
-Spouses had no claim of support from each other. In Ismaif3-1, Judge Trengrove refused to
recognise the validity of a Muslim marriage because it had the potential of being polygynous
(although it in fact was not). Thus, Mrs Ismail was refused the payment of maintenance.
-Children are illegitimate35
-there are no rights of succession between spouses on intestacy36
-Spouses are competent and compellable witnesses against each othe27
The debate about whether polygyny is in fact discriminatory continues with various respected
writers believing that it does not in itself lead to inequalities. For example, well known feminist
writers Kaganas and Murray38 put forth an extremely compelling argument advocating this view.
Rather, they argue that the inequalities within the marriage reflect more on the oppressive
patriarchal nature of the customary marriage than the polygyny itself.
It is argued by the authors that within the male- centred family structure polygyny, at least
provide women with informal opportunities to attain some measure of autonomy. Thus, it allows
33 1997(12) BCLR 1716(D)
34 Gp cit, n 28
35 See Kaba v Ntela 1919 TS 964 and Docrat v Bhayat 1932 TPD 125
36 Mthembu v Letsela 1997(2)SA 936(TPD)
37 .
See Nalana v Rex 1907 TS 407 and S v Johardien 1990(1) SA1026 (e)
38 C Murray and ~ Kaganas 'Law, Women and the Family: The Question of Polygyny in a
New South Afnca' (1991) Acta Juridica pl16-134 at127
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co-wives to share the domestic and farm duties and free the women to engage in economic
activities while at the same time providing companionship and reducing the sexual demands on
each wife and enables them to space their children.
Taking this argument into consideration, it is respectfully submitted that when measured against
the criteria used for the equality test, such argument cannot prevail. The test of equality is
essentially based on the ideal of upholding human dignity. The writer has had some contact with
women involved in polygynous marriages and from this experience can point out that these
women do in fact compete for their husbands attention and financial resources. There is no
sisterly friendship and children born of these unions are also competitive. In time, all involved
become bitter and resentful.
Armstrong et aP9 hold the same views. They argue that in polygynous marriages, the husband
has a duty of support towards more than one spouse while the wife has a duty of support to only
one husband. With regard to the power relations between the spouses, there is clear inequality
since the wives must share the husband's resources and attention and have competing interests
with regard to these. Thus, polygyny encourages competition rather than solidarity.
Perhaps what may have been a valid argument in the past has changed with time. With the
advance of migrant labour and urbanisation of cultures, emphasis on the extended family has
waned. Thus, where one man has more than one wife, each wife has her own home and operates
independently of the other. This then leads to constant battle for a husband who cannot be in two
places at one time and his financial resources have to stretch to accommodate more.
5.1. APPLICATION OF THE TEST OF EQUALITY
5.1.1 It has no rational connection to any present day customary practice.
5.1.2 There is unfair discrimination on the ground of gender as only men are allowed to marry
more than once. However, this is not the issue. More than that, Black women who marry by
customary law do not have any choice in the matter. If the husband wants a second wife, he can
get one despite any concerns of the first wife. Hence, the husband may start treating the first wife
and her children differently, perhaps not supporting her financially or not giving them any
attention. Thus the rights of the first wife as accorded to women in civil marriages do not apply.
5.1.3 It cannot be saved by the limitation clause because in the present day, there is no
reasonable or justifiable explanation for it.
Although the incidence of polygyny is declining, it is recognised that many Black people still
retain a strong allegiance to tradition. Therefore, they are more likely to campaign for its retention
because of the threat to their cultural heritage rather than any interest they may have in the
39 A. Armstrong et al 'Uncovering reality: Excavating Women's Rights in African Family Law'
(1993) 7 International Journal ofLaw and the Family at 336
12
practice itself.
It must be recognised there are some women who would honestly not mind if their husband' s t~e
several wives. On the other hand, there will also be women who really do not want to share theIr
husbands. If polygyny is to survive as a tradition and be part of a constitutional South Africa thi eP
must be recognised. All Black women should be given a voice on what should be done with
regard to the tradition.
Various ideas have been suggested on how to deal with the issue of polygyny. Maithufi40 is of
the view that the nature ofthe marriage, whether polygynous or monogamous should not be used
as the criteria for non-recognition. He suggests that what must be determined is whether the
community within which that marriage occurs regards it as legally binding. Bronstein41 advocates
the idea of 'intra-cultural conflict' as a way of transcending the entire customary law/gender
equality debate. She writes,
"The fight is no longer between culture and equality. Rather it is between two different
interest groups battling to retain/change power relations within their very culture - a
culture which is constantly evolving. "
Using this formulation the wife, seen as an equal partner in the marriage, should have the power
to 'veto' her husband's future marriages. If the first wife's refusal causes a divorce then the
husband is the one at fault. He should forfeit lobolo and take other fault-related consequences.
It is submitted, with respect, that these suggestions are not tenable for the following reasons: If
we were to accept the mores of the community as the defining trait of a marriage, then those
marriages that took place in tribal villages and rural areas will most probably be recognised while
those that take place in the urban suburbs will probably not be accepted. Furthermore, this
outl~o.k does n~t deal with t~e issue of ~ constitutional contradic~n between the equality
prOVISIon of sectlon 9 and the nght to practlce customary law. If we were to accept Bronstein' s
suggestion, then we will be redefining the divorce law in South Africa where the element of fault
is no longer part of the criteria.
Hence, borrowing from Bronstein, it is suggested that it should become law that before a man
enters into a second marriage the consent of the first wife must be attained. Furthermore, men
should only be eligible to take second wives if they meet certain criteria, for example, a particular
financial income in order to be responsible for two households. These laws could operate along
similar lines as the maintenance laws in South Africa where, on divorce, the husband must pay
a set amount for the maintenance of his wife and children42 . This would ensure that both
40 LP Maithufi 'Possible Recognition of Polygamous Marriages' (1997) 60 THRHR 695-
699 at 698
41 Gp cit, n2 at 403
42 This would of course be subject to the fact that the couple are still married and the
husband still retains his role in the household.
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households receive adequate care. If at any point the first wife decides that the relationship is not
working, then she should be entitled to a divorce with maintenance, the option of custody of her
children and, as suggested by Bronstein43 the husband must forfeit the lobolo payment.
The legislature must make a decision regulating polygyny once and for all. Does South Africa
recognise the institution or not? The way the law stands currently, we are neither here nor there
which gives rise to uncertainty and frustration. Clearly, the decisions of the courts' thus far have
been unsatisfactory. Women in customary law marriages perform the same duties and fulfil the
same expectations as women in civil marriages, so why should their rights differ? It is
understandable why the legislature has been hesitant to deal with this issue. It is likely to give rise
to public outcry whichever way it is decided.
6. CONCLUSION
The Constitution as a whole is founded on and informed by the principle of equality. Thus, it
would be meaningless if customary law were permitted to trump equality in the guise of tradition
and culture. Our country is in a state of fluctuation and therefore, now is the time to effect
positive changes into our law. The writer submits that a complete overhaul of the customary law
is required to align it with the gender equality clause.
In this regard, Kaganas and Murray44 say that to challenge patriarchy, women must be
empowered. They suggest education in order to widen their options. A good example of this was
illustrated by the South African Law Commission45 survey which showed that the greatest
rejection of polygyny occurred among those with post-school qualifications while those with
standard one or lower qualification objected the least. Similar research in other countries reflect
the same conclusions.
In particular, with regard to marriage, it is suggested that pre-marriage counselling should be
made compulsory for all couples in order to make them aware of their rights within the marriage.
This would circumvent the problem of women entering the marriage ignorant of the changing
laws.
Political organisation and the support of community structures were also noted. Community
education is imperative if there is to be a reshaping of valued traditions into workable principles
in the contemporary society. The reality is that South Africa is very much a part of the Western
world despite being a third world country and if traditions are to survive, they have to make
accommodations for the fact that its people have changed. Black people have changed. Black
43 Gp cif, n2 at 409
44 Gp cif, n38 at 134
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women have changed. Traditions and social norms are circular concepts which can only work if
they continue to reflect each other. In this light it must be recognised that customary law can only
survive constitutional scrutiny ifit can be"moulded to accommodate the changes in and the needs
of our society.
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